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Constitutionally Unaccountable: Privatized Immigration
Detention
DANIELLE C. JEFFERIS*
For-profit, civil immigration detention is one of this nation’s fastest growing
industries. About two-thirds of the more than 50,000 people in the civil custody of
federal immigration authorities find themselves at one point or another in a private,
corporate-run prison that contracts with the federal government. Conditions of
confinement in many of these facilities are dismal. Detainees have suffered from
untreated medical conditions and endured months, in some cases years, of detention
in environments that are unsafe and, at times, violent. Some have died. Yet, the spaces
are largely unregulated.
This Article exposes and examines the absence of a constitutional tort remedy for
the people behind the walls of for-profit immigration prisons. Two Supreme Court
decisions are relevant: Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko and Minneci
v. Pollard. These cases focus on the availability of constitutional tort remedies
against private prison operators and their employees for people incarcerated
pursuant to the government’s criminal law authority, not civil immigrationenforcement authority. Yet, on the federal level, the growth of for-profit civil
detention is far outpacing that of for-profit criminal incarceration. And the
conditions in today’s immigration detention facilities—and the experience of the
people in custody—are inherently carceral; there is no meaningful difference
between criminal incarceration and civil immigration confinement. This Article
asserts that the same values that underpin constitutional jurisprudence regulating
criminal incarceration—namely, the constitutional principle of dignity and the
inherently governmental function of incarceration, as well as values of transparency
and accountability—must allow for a constitutional tort remedy for people whose
rights are violated in for-profit immigration prisons. Otherwise, for many thousands
of people—the majority of whom are people of color—the Constitution and federal
courts are out of reach, leaving some of the most egregious rights violations inflicted
on the federal government’s watch unremedied.

* Clinical Teaching Fellow, Civil Rights Clinic, University of Denver College of Law.
I presented drafts of this Article at the Clinical Law Review Writers’ Workshop at New York
University School of Law and the Association of American Law Schools Conference on
Clinical Legal Education, where I received invaluable feedback from Kaci Bishop, Matthew
Boaz, Richard Boswell, Katherine Evans, Daniel Gandert, Valeria Gomez, Mary Gundrum,
Lindsay Harris, Mary Holper, Emily Torstviet Ngara, Michele Pistone, Rebecca Sharpless,
Stacy Taeuber, and Virgil Wiebe. I would like to also thank César Cuauhtémoc García
Hernández for his leading work in this field, as well as Christina Lynn Brown, Bryce Downer,
Aaron Elinoff, Nicole B. Godfrey, Olivia Kohrs, Tamara Kuennen, Nancy Leong, Sarah
Matsumoto, Alexandra Parrott, Laura Rovner, and Katherine Wallat for sharing their
expertise, feedback, and time. Additionally, I owe gratitude to the editors of the Indiana Law
Journal, including Ben Burdick, Madalyn Clary, Hannah Michalek, Steve Marino, Charles
Rice, and Brittni Crofts Wassmer, for their careful work preparing this Article for publication.
Any and all errors are mine.

146

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:145

When the history of the United States in the last quarter of the twentieth century is
written, it may be recalled as the period of the “second great confinement.”
- Jonathan Simon1
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INTRODUCTION
Roberto2 was shot on the streets in June 2016. He sustained multiple gunshot
wounds, causing life-threatening internal injuries. At the hospital, doctors performed
emergency surgery to repair his organs. They inserted a stent in Roberto’s abdomen
to address the internal bleeding. Although Roberto had numerous bullet fragments in
his body, removing those objects was a secondary concern to stopping the bleeding
and keeping him alive. Surgeons advised Roberto he must undergo a series of
surgeries over the next several months to remove the remaining fragments and to
monitor the stent.
Three months later, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials
arrested Roberto, charged him with civil immigration law violations, initiated
removal proceedings against him, and detained him in a private detention center
contracting with ICE. When he arrived at the facility, Roberto informed the staff of
his injuries and need for further treatment. He showed them the pieces of bullet
protruding from just under his skin over his rib cage. He requested medical assistance
repeatedly for his severe back and abdominal pain and his ensuing abnormal weight
loss. The only medical treatment the detention center staff provided Roberto was
ibuprofen, Pepto-Bismol, and a second mattress for his bed. The bullet-fragment sites
turned black and blue and oozed pus. Roberto did not see a doctor or receive further
treatment for more than a year. If Roberto had been confined in a state prison or a
federal government-run prison, the law would have allowed him to sue the officials
responsible for the apparent violation of his constitutional right to adequate medical

1. Jonathan Simon, Refugees in a Carceral Age: The Rebirth of Immigration Prisons in
the United States, 10 PUB. CULTURE 577, 577 (1998).
2. This name has been changed to protect the person’s identity.
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care and, if successful, recover some compensation for the harm he suffered due to
their failure to treat his condition. But Roberto was in a private immigration prison—
run by a corporation contracting with the federal government—which meant he had
no way to vindicate this apparent past violation of his constitutional right.
A substantial body of law has developed regarding the constitutional limits of
incarceration in this country and, specifically, the contours of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 3 People convicted of a
crime and confined in state prisons, as well as in government-run prisons on the
federal level, to wait out their sentence are protected by the constitutional right to
adequate medical care, a safe prison environment, and humane conditions. They may
vindicate past violations of those rights through lawsuits alleging constitutional torts.
The Constitution affords no tort remedy, however, for people like Roberto who suffer
from untreated serious medical conditions, risks to their safety, and violence while
incarcerated in for-profit, federal immigration prisons. Conditions of confinement in
many of these facilities are dismal4 but the spaces are largely unregulated. As this
Article shows, they are constitutionally unaccountable.
This Article has three parts. Part I describes the landscape of the modern federal,
civil immigration detention system, including its origins, the government’s authority
to confine people, and the rise of the private detention regime. Part II compares and
contrasts the constitutional tort remedies available to people incarcerated in state
prisons and federal government-run prisons with those available to people confined
in for-profit immigration prisons. Part III asserts the remedies available to people in
private immigration prisons should at minimum be parallel to those available to
people confined in federal government-run prisons. This argument is based on three
primary considerations: the constitutional value of dignity, the constitutional
function of incarceration, and the constitutional goals of government transparency
and accountability.

3. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confinement
Is Cruel and Far Too Usual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741 (2015); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty,
Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881 (2009); Brittany
Glidden, Necessary Suffering?: Weighing Government and Prisoner Interests in Determining
What Is Cruel and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1815 (2012).
4. See, e.g., Fernanda Echavarri, Dozens of ICE Detainees Were Pepper-Sprayed by
Guards for Protesting at a Louisiana Jail, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 2, 2019),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/08/immigrant-detention-ice-bossier-louisiana
-pepper-spray/ [https://perma.cc/6MPK-QZ82]; Susan Greene, GEO-Run Aurora ICE
Detention Center Is Isolating Immigrants—Some Mentally Ill—in Prolonged Solitary
Confinement,
COLO.
INDEP.
(Aug.
6,
2019),
https://www.coloradoindependent.com/2019/08/06/ice-geo-detainees-solitary-confinement/
[https://perma.cc/F5VW-T7XX]; Hannah Rappleye & Lisa Riordan Seville, 24 Immigrants
Have Died in ICE Custody During the Trump Administration, NBC NEWS (June 9, 2019, 11:00
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/24-immigrants-have-died-ice-custody
-during-trump-administration-n1015291 [https://perma.cc/9RNN-YBU2]; Devon M. Sayers
& Catherine E. Shoichet, ICE Detainee Dies in Georgia While Waiting to Be Deported, CNN
(July 25, 2019, 1:41 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/25/us/georgia-ice-detainee
-dies/index.html [https://perma.cc/3S88-P88E]; Alice Speri, Detained, Then Violated,
INTERCEPT (Apr. 11, 2018, 12:11 PM), https://theintercept.com/2018/04/11/immigration
-detention-sexual-abuse-ice-dhs/ [https://perma.cc/UZC3-YMCQ].
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But first, two notes about terminology: One, migration-related confinement is
difficult to define consistently, in part because the system is vast and the authority to
incarcerate spans many agencies and jurisdictions. Some scholars rely on an
expansive definition of immigration detention that includes people who have been
charged or convicted criminally with an offense or offenses stemming from their
migration activity and are in the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service, the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, and state authorities.5 This Article focuses on one type of
migration-related confinement—the confinement imposed by the federal agencies
tasked with enforcing civil immigration laws, including ICE and U.S. Customs and
Border Protection—but even that definition is imprecise in characterizing the
confinement as “civil.”6 Nevertheless, for purposes of this Article, I focus on socalled “civil” immigration detention to highlight the disparities between people
confined for putatively civil reasons and those incarcerated pursuant to criminal law
and leave the deconstruction of the term “civil detention” itself for future work.
Two, I deliberately use “detention” and “prison” interchangeably throughout the
Article. The conditions in immigration detention, and the experiences of those
confined in them, make the use of “prison” appropriate. When I separate the two
terms, it is largely to differentiate between the legal powers under which people are
confined: immigration detention being pursuant to so-called civil legal powers and
prison being pursuant to criminal legal powers.
I.

CIVIL IMMIGRATION CONFINEMENT: HISTORY, AUTHORITY, PROFITEERING

To fairly assess the significance of a constitutional tort remedy for those confined
in private immigration prisons, it is helpful to first understand the history of, authority
for, and today’s sheer scope of civil immigration confinement in the United States,
as well as for-profit corporations’ roles in overseeing and managing that system.
Much like the American criminal law system incarcerates the most people in the
world,7 the United States is also the titleholder for the world’s largest civil
immigration detention system. The number of people confined in the custody of civil
immigration enforcement agencies each year is approximately double the number of
people in federal criminal custody.8

5. See, e.g., César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Abolishing Immigration Prisons, 97
B.U. L. REV. 245, 248 n.8 (2017) (defining “immigration prisons” as “secure facilities in which
migrants are confined due to a suspected or confirmed violation of immigration law,”
including spaces confining people under both civil and criminal law powers); id. at 252–53
(discussing the “blurry boundary between civil detention and criminal confinement for
migration-related activity” and asserting “[w]hether acting under the authority of civil or
criminal law, law enforcement officials at every level of government regularly take into
custody people who are thought to have violated immigration laws”).
6. See René Lima-Marín & Danielle C. Jefferis, It’s Just Like Prison: Is a Civil
(Nonpunitive) System of Immigration Detention Theoretically Possible?, 96 DENV. L. REV.
955 (2019); Danielle C. Jefferis, The Civil Detention Fallacy (2019) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
7. E.g., Evangeline Dech, Nonprofit Organizations: Humanizing Immigration
Detention, 53 CAL. W. L. REV. 219, 221 (2017).
8. Id. at 220 (“The Department of Homeland Security (‘DHS’) detains around 400,000
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The civil immigration detention apparatus is the fastest growing component of the
American system of mass incarceration.9 Even by its own measure, the federal
government incarcerates an unprecedented and growing number of people each year
pursuant to its civil immigration enforcement authority. In 2017, estimates of the
average daily population of people confined for immigration-related offenses ranged
from more than 38,00010 to as much as 40,500.11 By the end of 2018, the daily
detention population exceeded 48,000.12 In early 2019, the number of people
confined by ICE alone reached nearly 50,000,13 and by the middle of 2019, the figure
exceeded 52,000—an apparent all-time high.14 Annually, the government
incarcerates nearly 400,000 people under the same authority, 15 a figure that has also
grown substantially over the last few years, and one the government is likely to
surpass in 2019.
To expand this system of incarceration, the government relies heavily on private,
for-profit corporations to operate civil immigration prisons.16 With no means to

people each year, giving the United States one of the largest immigration detainee populations
in the world.”); Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration Detention, 38 CARDOZO L. REV.
2141, 2142 (2017) (“Immigration detention has become one of the most egregious forms of
mass incarceration in the United States. Over 440,000 immigrants are detained in this country
each year, far more than anywhere else in the world.”); see also Dora Schriro, Women and
Children First: An Inside Look at the Challenges to Reforming Family Detention in the United
States, in CHALLENGING IMMIGRATION DETENTION: ACADEMICS, ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 28, 30–32 (Michael J. Flynn & Matthew B. Flynn eds., 2017); MARY SMALL, DET.
WATCH NETWORK, A TOXIC RELATIONSHIP: PRIVATE PRISONS AND U.S. IMMIGRATION
DETENTION 2 (2016).
9. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1348 (2014); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110
Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 42, 44–45 (2010) (“The growth in immigration detention in recent
years has been remarkable. In 1994, officials held approximately 6,000 noncitizens in
detention on any given day. That daily average had surpassed 20,000 individuals by 2001 and
33,000 by 2008. Over the same period, the overall number of individuals detained each year
has swelled from approximately 81,000 to approximately 380,000.”).
10. EMILY RYO & IAN PEACOCK, THE LANDSCAPE OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE
UNITED STATES 6 (2018).
11. DET. WATCH NETWORK & NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., ICE LIES: PUBLIC
DECEPTION, PRIVATE PROFIT 2 (2018).
12. Erica Werne, Damian Paletta & Seung Min Kim, Shutdown Looms as Border Talks
Break Down over Immigration Enforcement, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2019, 5:51 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/border-talks-at-impasse-as-shutdown
-looms-friday-officials-say/2019/02/10/aa8ef08c-2d36-11e9-813a-0ab2f17e305b_story.html
?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/AS6E-CK5M].
13. Id.
14. Hamed Aleaziz, More Than 52,000 People Are Now Being Detained By ICE, an
Apparent
All-Time
High,
BUZZFEED
(May
20,
2019,
6:58
PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/ice-detention-record-immigrants
-border [https://perma.cc/E9RS-36R3].
15. Dech, supra note 7, at 220.
16. See RYO & PEACOCK, supra note 10, at 14.
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enforce detention standards17 and few mechanisms to hold them accountable for
violating those standards, for-profit immigration prisons are the subjects of the
highest number of grievances the federal government receives from the people
confined in its custody.18
A. Confinement History
So-called civil detention19—that is, nonpunitive incarceration—in the United
States is nearly as old as the country’s founding.20 From the enslavement of millions
of people from Africa to the forced displacement of indigenous people to the
internment of Asian Americans and others during the first half of the twentieth
century, the federal government has a long history of confining people pursuant to
powers outside of the criminal process.21
But in the immigration sphere, the federal government did not always default to
detention.22 Indeed, the federal government stayed out of immigration regulation
almost entirely for much of the country’s first century, leaving the matter to the
states.23 In the middle of the nineteenth century, however, federal government
officials began requiring transatlantic companies to detain migrants on arriving ships
while assessing whether to allow the noncitizens to “enter” the United States. 24 This
arrangement soon turned into detention at onshore sites operated by the shipping
companies25—where conditions were nightmarish26—and then at government-run

17. See Steven Neeley, Comment, Immigration Detention: The Inaction of the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 729, 738 (2008).
18. See RYO & PEACOCK, supra note 10, at 28.
19. I say “so-called” here because I question the premise that nonpunitive detention is
possible. See generally Jefferis, supra note 6; Lima-Marín & Jefferis, supra note 6, at 11
20. Juliet P. Stumpf, Civil Detention and Other Oxymorons, 40 QUEEN’S L.J. 55, 62
(2014).
21. Schriro, supra note 8, at 29; see generally Stephanie J. Silverman, Immigration
Detention in America: A History of Its Expansion and a Study of Its Significance (Ctr. on
Migration, Policy, & Soc’y, Univ. of Oxford, Working Paper No. 80, 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1867366 [https://perma.cc/EER4-LYD9].
22. Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45
HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 601, 610 (2010); Ana Raquel Minian, America Didn’t
Always
Lock
Up
Immigrants,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
1,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/01/opinion/sunday/border-detention-tear-gas
-migrants.html [https://perma.cc/MZX4-FXB]; see also CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA
HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW 240 (2015); Dech, supra note 7, at 223–24.
23. CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON 21 (2019).
24. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 23, at 24.
25. See, e.g., GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 23, at 24–25 (describing how the federal
government created the legal “entry fiction” to permit shipping companies to allow passengers
to disembark but remain confined in onshore private detention sites while the government
processed their admission to—or exclusion from—the United States).
26. Id. at 25–26 (“Soon conditions inside early immigration prisons were atrocious. ‘The
air is impure, the place is crowded,’ wrote one visitor to a San Francisco ‘Chinese jail,’ as the
dockside facilities were often described. ‘I have visited quite a few jails and State prisons in
this country, but have never seen any place half so bad,’ he added.”).
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Ellis and Angel Islands by the late nineteenth century. 27 Immigration confinement on
the mass scale did not emerge, however, until the 1980s.28 Three primary
developments over the course of the 1980s and 1990s spurred this emergence of the
modern system of immigration incarceration: the arrival of thousands of Cuban and
Haitian refugees and exiles during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift and migration
movements that soon followed,29 the evolution of the government’s “detention as
deterrence” platform,30 and growth of “crimmigration” law and its attendant
mandatory detention provisions.31
Through the early and middle twentieth century, the detention of people for
migration-related reasons in the United States declined in comparison to the era of
Ellis and Angel Islands.32 Immigration rates fell over those decades, due in part to
the Great Depression and harsh U.S. immigration policies. 33 By the middle of the
twentieth century, detention was reserved for unusual circumstances—usually
“migrants who were deemed likely to abscond or who posed a threat to national
security or public safety.”34 Indeed, by January 1955, fewer than five people in
immigration custody were seeking entry into the country.35 What had once been the

27. E.g., GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 240; Dech, supra note 7, at 223 (“The
Ellis Island facility in New York Harbor was the first federally operated immigration detention
center in the United States.”); Simon, supra note 1, at 579; Stumpf, supra note 20, at 64.
28. Minian, supra note 22; Simon, supra note 1, at 579.
29. Minian, supra note 22; Simon, supra note 1, at 579.
30. Minian, supra note 22; Simon, supra note 1, at 583 (“The new imprisonment policy
was aimed at substituting the deterrent of the prison for the removal discretion lost to the
Refugee Act.”).
31. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 240–42 (“By way of comparison, the INS had
the capacity to detain approximately 1,700 migrants on average per day in 1982 and about
7,000 in 1990. By the end of the century, the agency held just shy of 20,000 each day. Ten
years later . . . the average daily population had again grown by 10,000. . . . Much of this
growth can be attributed to the increasingly punitive views of immigration law violators that
started in the 1980s and have yet to abate. In the last three decades . . . Congress and multiple
presidential administrations have intertwined criminal law and immigration law so that tactics
traditionally associated with one are now prominent features of the other. In this case, criminal
punishment’s long reliance on incarceration as a means of deterring—theoretically at least—
and punishing undesirable conduct has become an accepted part of immigration law
enforcement.”).
32. Minian, supra note 22 (“The United States first imposed immigration detention in the
late 19th century. But by the early 1950s, detaining migrants no longer seemed necessary.”).
33. Id. (“European and Asian migration had fallen drastically as a result of the
Immigration Act of 1924 and the Great Depression.”).
34. Id.
35. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 8 (“Indeed, from the 1950s until the 1980s, the
[Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)] had a policy of not using detention except in
unusual circumstances.”); Simon, supra note 1, at 579 (“A few cases of immigration
imprisonment made their way through the courts in the 1940s and 1950s, mainly involving
aliens suspected of subversion on behalf of the Axis powers and later the Soviet Union. In
1954 Ellis Island closed its doors as an active immigration center, and with it closed the last
federal facility for imprisoning immigrants.”); Minian, supra note 22 (“Reflecting . . . this
change, in 1958 the Supreme Court, in Leng May Ma v. Barber, held that ‘physical detention
of aliens is now the exception, not the rule,’ pointing out that ‘certainly this policy reflects the
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rule at the height of the use of Ellis and Angel Islands—confinement—became the
exception.36
This measured approach to immigration confinement came to an end with the
Mariel Boatlift in the early 1980s and the arrival of thousands of Cuban and Haitian
migrants and refugees to the shores of the United States. 37 As for the former, more
than 120,000 Cubans fled Cuba for the United States en masse “in a highly politicized
migration that garnered national and international media attention and inspired fear
among many Americans”38 that was “the single largest Cuban exodus in history.”39
That public fear of the arriving Cubans was likely sparked by inaccurate accounts
that many or most of the arrivals were criminals, political prisoners, and “antisocials.”40
This manufactured and propagandized fear of the Cuban migrants and refugees 41
intersected with the federal government’s perception that the immigration system

humane qualities of an enlightened civilization.’”) (footnote omitted).
36. García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1372 (“Detention has long been part of the
immigration law enforcement arsenal, but before the 1980s it was never a central feature of
immigration policing. Instead, it was always the exception. Indeed, from 1954 until the early
1980s the INS tended to release individuals suspected of violating immigration laws.”).
37. Id. at 1360 (“The 1980s proved to be a crucial period in enacting the legislation that
laid the groundwork for today’s massive immigration incarceration. This was the period when
Haitians boarded rickety rafts in large numbers hoping to make their way to the United States,
and Cubans left the port of Mariel looking to join South Florida’s prospering émigré
community.”); Simon, supra note 1, at 579 (“Immigration imprisonment was reinvented in
1981 in response to the massive immigration flow to south Florida in the spring of 1980 that
became known as the Mariel boatlift.”); Minian, supra note 22.
38. Minian, supra note 22; see also MARK S. HAMM, THE ABANDONED ONES: THE
IMPRISONMENT AND UPRISING OF THE MARIEL BOAT PEOPLE 51–52 (1995).
39. HAMM, supra note 38, at 50 (citations omitted).
40. Id. 50–51 (“While it is cavalier to make generalizations, accounts indicate that some
of the refugees were ‘anti-socials,’ former political prisoners, and petty criminals. However,
the same accounts of the Freedom Flotilla reveal that the vast majority of Cubans passing
through Mariel were upstanding family members who were students, government employees,
professionals, or laborers. They were farmers, mechanics, fishermen, truck drivers,
seamstresses, accountants, construction workers, plumbers, carpenters, and professional
baseball players. It is estimated that 75 percent of the refugees were of working age and, of
those, 57 percent were men.”) (citations omitted); Simon, supra note 1, at 590–91 (“The racial
stereotypes triggered by their physical appearance were even further distorted by early and
erroneous press reports that the Mariel Cubans included a large number of physically and
mentally disabled persons and criminals. The Mariel immigrants were viciously and largely
inaccurately stamped from the start with the stigma of dangerousness. The public perception
was of an overwhelmingly unskilled mass likely to be dependent, if not predatory, on
American society. In fact, the Marielitos were a highly diverse lot in terms of economic
potential.”) (citations omitted).
41. Simon, supra note 1, at 582–83 (“The Mariel Cuban refugees, after all, fit the same
ideological position in the then-reactivated cold war of the 1980s (as did Nicaraguans a few
years later), yet they were also quickly stigmatized as criminals and deviants. In addition to
the weakening of the cold war logic, refugees in the 1980s were increasingly seen in a new
framework of threat. The new nexus was not the superpower rivalry, but the mass of poor
(both domestic and foreign) perceived as a new dangerous class whose unconstrained needs
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was incapable of processing large numbers of people en masse. Although the newly
enacted Refugee Act of 1980, which marked the nation’s adoption of the
international definition of “refugee,”42 provided for provisional admission of the
people arriving to the United States, the refugees had to be processed and screened
extensively by officials before the government permitted them to reside lawfully
within the United States.43 The assessment and processing, which included an
individualized medical examination with X-rays and lab tests, was in contrast to the
government’s swift removal of migrants who could not satisfy admission
requirements.44 To manage screening tens of thousands of new arrivals, the federal
government resorted to incarceration.45
The arrival of the Cubans coincided with increased migration from Haiti, with
more than a thousand Haitians arriving in the United States each month during the
same period.46 Soon the government’s “detention as the exception” reverted back to
detention as the rule.47

and desires threatened to overwhelm the nation.”).
42. Simon, supra note 1, at 583 (“The new law for the first time adopted the prevailing
international law definition of a refugee. The relevant legal question became whether the
immigrant as an individual had a credible fear of persecution on the grounds of religion, race,
or politics, not what race or nationality they belonged to.”); see also Cheryl Little, United
States Haitian Policy: A History of Discrimination, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 269, 271
(1993) (“The Refugee Act of 1980 was meant to bring United States law into conformity with
international treaty obligations and to establish a permanent, systematic procedure for meeting
the humanitarian needs of refugees and those seeking asylum in the United States.”).
43. HAMM, supra note 38, at 54 (“The Refugee Act required that each Cuban undergo a
medical examination (complete with X-rays and lab tests) and interviews with agents of the
INS, the FBI, the Pentagon, and the CIA. If it was determined that a[ noncitizen] posed no
threat to the safety of the general public, then he or she was placed on ‘parole’ by the INS with
the understanding that if there was no violation of the law, he or she would become eligible
for permanent U.S. residence after seven years. But if convicted of a crime during that seven
years, a[ noncitizen] would be deported.”) (citations omitted).
44. See Simon, supra note 1, at 583 (“The immediate effect of the [Refugee Act of 1980]
was to make it possible for those refugees who could find legal advice to file claims that would
at least delay their removal. In short, the INS was not able to quickly remove those
inconvenient and threatening asylum seekers as it had through the late 1970s.”) (citation
omitted).
45. Id.; Minian, supra note 22 (“During the 1980s, Americans came to see . . . hundreds
of other Cuban exiles as such a dangerous threat that they once again turned to detention as an
acceptable way to manage immigration. . . . News had spread swiftly that Mr. Castro’s
government had sent criminals and mentally ill people among the arriving exiles. Although
very few of the exiles had committed crimes, much less serious ones, fear of this wave of
immigrants became widespread. This fear, fueled by rising crime rates in Miami and other
communities where the Cuban exiles settled, led many Americans to demand the detention of
the new arrivals. . . . Americans had come to fear these exiles so much that few of them
protested their imprisonment and only a small number of legal workers tried to help them. The
practice of detention was seen as necessary and normal.”).
46. Carlos Ortiz Miranda, Haiti and the United States During the 1980s and 1990s:
Refugees, Immigration, and Foreign Policy, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 673, 681 (1995).
47. Little, supra note 42, at 277.
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To implement this new detention-as-rule policy, the government needed spaces in
which to confine the thousands of people seeking admission to the United States. The
federal agencies began by opening up two large relocation camps in southern
Florida.48 The camps were soon filled to capacity, so the government opened more
camps and, soon, “service processing centers.”49 Thousands of Cuban and Haitian
migrants and refugees languished for years in prisons across the country, some
makeshift on military bases, others in Bureau of Prisons facilities—including the
maximum-security prison in Atlanta—alongside people serving criminal sentences,
with little to no mechanism to challenge their detention or to adjudicate their
immigration status in the United States.50
The arrivals of the Cuban and Haitian refugees also sparked the government’s
“detention as deterrence” platform, the second primary contributor to the rise in
immigration confinement.51 In his article Refugees in a Carceral Age, Professor
Jonathan Simon describes how the federal government modeled its detention-asdeterrence platform off the practice of “humane deterrence” in Thailand:

48. HAMM, supra note 38, at 53; García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1360–61.
49. HAMM, supra note 38, at 53–54 (“Yet the massive influx of Cubans to the U.S.—
which approached nearly sixty thousand during the week of May 20 alone—demanded
supplemental receiving and processing facilities beyond these two camps. Accordingly, the
INS established additional relocation facilities at Elgin Air Force Base and Fort Walton Beach,
Florida; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; and Fort Chaffee,
Arkansas.”) (citations omitted); Simon, supra note 1, at 579 (“To address the potential for
unauthorized immigration to south Florida, the [INS] opened the Krome Avenue Detention
Center on a former Nike missile site twenty miles from downtown Miami, on the edges of the
Florida Everglades. By the early 1990s the INS operated nine such ‘service processing centers’
with a combined capacity of about 2,500 persons.”) (citations omitted).
50. HAMM, supra note 38, at 52; García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1360–61 (“To deal
with the approximately 125,000 Cuban ‘marielitos’ who came to the United States in 1979
and 1980, the INS moved rapidly to set up immigration detention camps as well as to find
space in the federal penitentiary in Atlanta to house the new arrivals.”) (footnote omitted);
Minian, supra note 22 (“[T]he exiles waited to be sponsored by someone (or some institution)
who agreed to take care of them until they could settle on their own. As the months went by,
most exiles left the military bases, but those who had no family members or acquaintances in
the United States often had difficulty finding sponsors. This placed them in an impossible
situation. Without sponsorship, the only way they could leave the camps was by leaving the
United States. But government officials could not deport them because the Castro government
refused to take them back. These exiles, many of whom were labeled ‘antisocial’ but not
accused of having committed any crime, were to remain in cages in the United States on an
indefinite basis, with no prospects of being set free. . . . By 1982, about 400 Mariel Cubans
who still had not been sponsored were sent to prison, primarily to the maximum-security
penitentiary in Atlanta.”).
51. Simon, supra note 1, at 583 (“The new imprisonment policy was aimed at substituting
the deterrent of the prison for the removal discretion lost to the Refugee Act.”); Minian, supra
note 22 (“[The federal government] also conceived of detention as a way to deter migrants—
particularly Haitians, who had been fleeing their country since 1971—from setting sail to the
United States. Up to that point, immigration officials still tended to follow the policy of
releasing Haitians on parole pending a hearing and status determination, although they
intermittently detained arriving Haitian migrants. By 1981, immigration officials were
detaining all Haitians who arrived without offering them the possibility of parole.”).
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Faced with large numbers of “boat people” fleeing the chaos of postwar
Vietnam and Cambodia, and constrained by Western nations from
forcibly repatriating refugees, the Thais established imprisonment
camps. The challenge of this strategy was to make conditions
uncomfortable enough to discourage refugees from some of the poorest
and most oppressive countries in the world. Despite outcry from Western
human rights groups, Western governments were distinctly reluctant to
pressure the Thais to halt this approach.52
In other words, to stop others from seeking admission to the United States—to send
a message—the government would incarcerate large numbers of those who tried.53
The third factor contributing to the rise of the country’s mass immigration
incarceration system was the emergence and growth of “crimmigration” law.
Crimmigration law refers to the intersection of “criminal law and procedure with
immigration law and procedure.”54 Describing its emergence, Professor César
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández writes:
For most of the nation’s history, [criminal law and immigration law]
operated almost entirely free of the other. Criminal law and procedure
was thought to be the province of prosecutors, criminal defense
attorneys, and the state and federal judges who oversee criminal
prosecutions every day. Immigration law, in contrast, was confined to
immigration courts housed within the executive branch of the federal
government and staffed by immigration attorneys, immigration judges,
and prosecutors employed for many years by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) and now the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) or Department of Justice.
That division has undeniably become a historical relic. The world of
criminal courthouses has collided with the world of immigration
courthouses. The substantive criminal law that defines what constitutes
a state or federal crime has increasingly come to turn on a person’s
immigration status. Criminal procedure norms embodied in court rules
and constitutional amendments have made special allowances for
immigration law enforcement concerns and the citizenship status of
defendants. Meanwhile, immigration law now frequently turns to a
migrant’s criminal history to dictate whether imprisonment is merited
while the government decides whether to mete out immigration law’s
greatest sanction, deportation, and its close cousin, exclusion from the
United States.55

52. Simon, supra note 1, at 584.
53. García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1361 (“According to Attorney General William
French Smith, there was no other way to stop them from coming: ‘Detention of aliens seeking
asylum was necessary to discourage people like the Haitians from setting sail in the first
place.’”); Simon, supra note 1, at 584.
54. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 1.
55. Id. at 1–2.
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As the law began to treat violations of immigration law more harshly and more
punitively, and in many ways linked them to violations of criminal law, the carceral
component of enforcement began to take shape.56
The integration of criminal and immigration enforcement began in the 1980s,
during the height of the War on Drugs, when Congress enacted a series of laws
requiring the detention of a certain group of noncitizens.57 Confinement authority
grew again in 1996 with the federal government’s enactment of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).58 These two laws “marked a ‘seismic
change’ in immigration detention—one from which the federal government has not
turned.”59 While AEDPA and IIRIRA may have had the greatest impact in the
shortest amount of time, through all of these laws—enacted and implemented over
the course of under two decades—the government expanded the categories and types
of crimes that could trigger removal proceedings and the classes of noncitizens for
whom detention was mandatory.60

56. Id. at 240–42 (“By way of comparison, the INS had the capacity to detain
approximately 1,700 migrants on average per day in 1982 and about 7,000 in 1990. By the end
of the century, the agency held just shy of 20,000 each day. Ten years later, . . . the average
daily population had again grown by 10,000. . . . Much of this growth can be attributed to the
increasingly punitive views of immigration law violators that started in the 1980s and have yet
to abate. In the last three decades, . . . Congress and multiple presidential administrations have
intertwined criminal law and immigration law so that tactics traditionally associated with one
are now prominent features of the other. In this case, criminal punishment’s long reliance on
incarceration as a means of deterring—theoretically at least—and punishing undesirable
conduct has become an accepted part of immigration law enforcement.”).
57. García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1361–62 (“Relying in large part on the growing
desire to fight drugs, Congress enacted a series of laws between 1986 and 1994 that set the
legislative groundwork for the expansive immigration detention apparatus that exists today:
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
of 1986, the Refugee Assistance Extension Act of 1986, a 1986 joint congressional resolution,
the ADAA of 1988, the Crime Control Act of 1990, the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT
90), and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.”); Emily Ryo,
Fostering Legal Cynicism Through Immigration Detention, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 999, 1005–06
(2017).
58. García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1369–70 (“It was simply a matter of time before
the vast increase in the penal prison population experienced in the 1980s came to immigration.
Fifteen years after the INS subjected Haitians to mandatory detention and ten years after the
ADAA of 1986 began entangling immigration detention and the drug war, the well-known
duo of 1996 laws, AEDPA and IIRIRA, changed the face of immigration law.”) (footnotes
omitted).
59. Id. at 1370, 1370–72 (detailing impact of AEDPA and IIRIRA on U.S. immigration
detention legal framework).
60. RYO & PEACOCK, supra note 10, at 6; Heeren, supra note 22, at 610–11 (“In the wake
of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed two laws that toughened deportation
provisions and immigration detention. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (‘AEDPA’) greatly expanded both the definition of ‘aggravated felony’ and the
categories of immigrants subject to mandatory detention. After the passage of AEDPA,
immigrants who had been convicted of multiple crimes involving moral turpitude, controlled
substances offenses, firearms offenses, and certain national security-related offenses became
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As a result of these three developments beginning in the 1980s, the modern U.S.
immigration detention system emerged from nearly nothing to become one of the
most significant components of this country’s system of mass incarceration in five
decades. In 1955, the government held just four people in immigration custody. 61 In
1973, the average daily number of people detained was 2,370; in 1980, it was 4,062.62
By 2001, more than 200,000 people were being confined each year.63 By 2011, that
total had doubled.64 Annual figures have grown steadily since then in response to the
government’s sweeping authority to take away people’s liberty while they are
awaiting a decision as to whether they will be permitted to remain within this
country’s borders.65
B. Confinement Authority
Today, the federal government’s system of immigration incarceration is a
sweeping, multi-agency affair. Multiple components of executive-branch agencies
are responsible for executing federal civil immigration laws and are statutorily
authorized—and in some cases required—to confine people whose lives in some way
touch those laws. Of those components, the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S.

subject to detention during removal proceedings without possibility of bond. Soon after the
passage of AEDPA, Congress passed another law that expanded the scope of mandatory
detention: the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(‘IIRIRA’). IIRIRA expanded the increasingly bloated aggravated felony category, and thus
mandatory detention, to encompass still more types of crimes. After the passage of IIRIRA,
Congress codified the immigration detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1226.”) (footnotes
omitted); Ryo, supra note 57, at 1006 (“In 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act significantly
broadened the use of mandatory detention by widening its net over a larger class of
noncitizens.”) (footnotes omitted).
61. Minian, supra note 22.
62. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 23, at 10.
63. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 8 (“By 2001, over 200,000 people were being
detained each year while they waited to learn whether they would be allowed to remain in the
United States.”).
64. García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1348 (“In fiscal year 2011, for the first time in the
nation’s history, more than 400,000 people were confined while they waited to learn whether
they would be allowed to remain in the United States.”).
65. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 8 (“The immigration detention population has
continued to grow steadily since [2001]. In fiscal year 2011, for example, 429,247 people were
detained pending immigration proceedings. Meanwhile, Congress now requires that ICE pay
for a minimum of 34,000 beds per night, almost guaranteeing that the historically anomalous
annual detention population of recent years will not become a momentary blip.”); García
Hernández, supra note 9, at 1382 (“Today, immigration detention represents the single most
common confinement that occurs in the United States. In fiscal year 2012, the Department of
Homeland Security detained 477,523 individuals while removal proceedings were pending or
as they waited for actual removal from the country. . . . [R]ecent years have seen similarly
large numbers confined: 429,247 in FY 2011, 363,064 in FY 2010, and 383,524 in FY 2009.
In 2008 ICE claimed a ‘record total of 378,582, representing a 22 percent increase from 2007.’
That year, in turn, it reported detaining 311,169, a 21 percent rise from the previous year and
itself a record at the time.”) (footnotes omitted).
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the one responsible for the largest
numbers of people in immigration confinement. 66
ICE’s authority to incarcerate people falls into two distinct categories: mandatory
detention authority and discretionary detention authority. 67 Between the two forms
of authority, a significant proportion of people whose lives intersect in some way
with the nation’s immigration-enforcement system are at risk of detention.
Pursuant to its so-called mandatory detention authority,68 the government shall
take into custody69 any noncitizen who the government has “reason to believe is
removable for almost every crime-based reason, including crimes involving moral
turpitude, controlled substance offenses, and aggravated felonies,” 70 as well as
“certain classes of ‘arriving aliens,’ including those seeking asylum who have not
yet passed their credible fear determination.” 71 This provision provides no basis for
an immigration judge or other independent arbiter to consider bond or otherwise
release someone who is detained.72 More than half of the people experiencing
immigration confinement are held pursuant to this sweeping detention authority. 73
The law also obligates the government to confine people who have been ordered
removed during the period between the entering of the final removal order and the

66. García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1382 (“Today, immigration detention represents
the single most common confinement that occurs in the United States. In fiscal year 2012, the
Department of Homeland Security detained 477,523 individuals while removal proceedings
were pending or as they waited for actual removal from the country. . . . [R]ecent years have
seen similarly large numbers confined: 429,247 in FY 2011, 363,064 in FY 2010, and 383,524
in FY 2009. In 2008, ICE claimed a ‘record total of 378,582, representing a 22 percent increase
from 2007.’ That year, in turn, it reported detaining 311,169, a 21 percent rise from the
previous year and itself a record at the time.”) (footnotes omitted).
67. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 95–102; Ryo, supra note 57, at 1009–10
(describing discretionary and mandatory detention authority).
68. The contention that this provision mandates detention is dubious. As Professor García
Hernández explains, the statute provides that the government shall take into custody any
person falling into one or more of the enumerated categories. Custody, however, does not
traditionally or necessarily mean detention but includes any number of ways in which the
government may deprive a person of her liberty. See GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at
101.
69. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 236(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012).
70. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 99–100; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); Ryo,
supra note 57, at 1009 (explaining that the INA requires detention of “noncitizens, including
lawful permanent residents, convicted of certain crimes enumerated in the INA,” also known
as “triggering offenses”).
71. Ryo, supra note 57, at 1009.
72. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 100; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (“No court
may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the
detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.”). But
see Ryo, supra note 57, at 1010.
73. Ryo, supra note 57, at 1009–10 (“According to one report, about 66% of noncitizens
in immigration detention were held under the mandatory detention provisions in 2009.”).
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actual removal74 and those who the government has “reasonable grounds to believe”
pose a national security threat.75
Pursuant to its discretionary authority, the government may arrest anyone it
believes is removable from the United States and detain the person pending a
decision on his or her removability.76 Under this authority, an authorized ICE officer
may release the noncitizen on conditional parole or a bond77 upon a showing by the
noncitizen that he or she is not a flight risk or a danger to the community.78 If ICE
denies that initial custody determination, the person may seek the immigration
court’s review of ICE’s decision.79 The immigration court’s bond decision may be
appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). 80 The BIA’s bond
determination is not subject to further review and is therefore final.81
Critically, all of the above-discussed authority under which the federal
government may detain people is purportedly civil in nature. That is, immigration
confinement is somehow different than punitive incarceration because immigration
laws are civil, sanctions for violating immigration laws (for example, deportation)
are civil, and, therefore, detention in furtherance of executing immigration laws is
civil.82 This premise on which immigration detention authority is exercised is
discussed more in Part III.

74. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B); see also GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 22, at 102 (“Not
surprisingly, the INA requires detention of migrants ordered removed. According to the
statute, DHS is to remove individuals from the United States within ninety days of a removal
order becoming final, a window of time called the ‘removal period.’ After that ninety-day
removal period, a detained migrant may be released under DHS supervision. Through a
complicated review process governed by both the statute and regulations, designated
immigration officials essentially gauge a detained migrant’s likelihood to endanger the public.
Naturally, a detainee’s criminal record forms a significant part of this assessment.”) (citations
omitted).
75. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a)(1)–(3) (authorizing the Attorney General to take into custody a
noncitizen suspected of terrorism “if the Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe
that the [noncitizen] (A) is described in [one of the relevant sections] of this title; or (B) is
engaged in any other activity that endangers the national security of the United States.”).
76. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1).
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A)–(B).
78. Detention of Aliens Prior to Order of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8).
79. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1).
80. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(f).
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). But see Ryo, supra note 57 at 1009 (explaining that while the
bond determination is not judicially reviewable, a detainee may seek habeas review to
challenge the legality of his or her detention).
82. See Lima-Marín & Jefferis, supra note 6, at 11.
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C. Confinement Profiteering
Not only is the U.S. immigration detention system the largest in the world,83 it is
the world’s most privatized.84 Nearly 400,000 people are incarcerated under the
government’s immigration detention authority each year, an annual figure that has
seen substantial growth annually.85 The average daily population of people in
immigration confinement has also increased exponentially in the past two decades,86
reaching nearly 40,500 people per day in 2017.87 The government requested funding
for 52,000 daily beds in fiscal year 2019;88 after an intense budget debate during the
2018–19 government shutdown, Congress declined ICE’s request and authorized
detention-bed funding at 2018 levels—40,500 per day—in spite of Democrats’
efforts to reduce the number of detention beds to 35,400 per day. 89 Notwithstanding
Congress’s appropriation, ICE regularly detains more people than its funding
permits.90
According to a 2018 report, ICE relies on more than 630 sites throughout the
country to confine people under its immigration-enforcement authority. 91 Many of
these facilities are state prisons or local jails contracting with the federal government
to confine people for immigration-related reasons among those the jurisdiction
confines under its own authority.92 Others are prisons managed directly by the federal
government. Others still, are for-profit prisons run by private corporations and

83. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 23, at 10–11 (“During the last thirty years, both the
federal and state governments have increasingly tapped their powers to incarcerate people for
how they move across borders. As a result, the United States has the world’s largest immigrant
detention system, in which upward of half a million people annually now spend time locked
up because the government claims they violated immigration law.”).
84. SMALL, supra note 8, at 2 (“[I]n addition to being remarkable for its size, the U.S.
immigration detention system is an outlier for the degree to which it has been privatized.”).
85. See supra notes 8, 64 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 8, 64 and accompanying text.
87. MARY SMALL & HEIDI ALTMAN, DET. WATCH NETWORK & NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE
CTR., ICE LIES: PUBLIC DECEPTION, PRIVATE PROFIT 2 (2018).
88. See, e.g., Nick Miroff, Why Immigration Detention Beds Became a New Issue in
Trump Border Wall Fight, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2019, 8:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/why-immigration-detention-beds-are-the-new
-front-in-trump-border-wall-fight/2019/02/11/9c8e6d2a-2e15-11e9-813a-0ab2f17e305b
_story.html [https://perma.cc/724Y-TNDV].
89. Id.
90. Id. (“At a time when record numbers of Central American families have been showing
up at the border, the number of people held in ICE custody has soared to nearly 50,000 per
day, far above the number of beds Congress has funded.”).
91. RYO & PEACOCK, supra note 10, at 1.
92. Id. at 11 (“In fiscal year 2015, ICE used 638 facilities to detain noncitizens, including
juveniles. By far, the largest category—43 percent—were facilities with intergovernmental
service agreements (IGSAs). IGSAs are agreements between the federal government and a
state or local government to provide detention beds in jails, prisons, or other local or state
government detention facilities. These facilities are government owned, but they may be
operated by either local or state agencies or by for-profit companies.”).
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designed exclusively to detain people in the custody of immigration-enforcement
authorities—the focus of this Article.
Today, approximately two-thirds of the people comprising the annual detained
population total are confined in private, for-profit immigration prisons at some point
during their incarceration.93 Likewise, on any given day in the United States, a
similar two-thirds of all people in the government’s civil custody for migrationrelated reasons are living behind the walls of a prison constructed to generate income
and turn a profit for its shareholders.94 Those people in private facilities are often
confined for significantly longer periods of time than people in ICE-run prisons or
facilities run by state or local governments.95
The private, for-profit prison sector and the immigration incarceration system are
inextricable. Private migration-related confinement dates as far back as the
nineteenth century, when the federal government required shipping companies to
keep noncitizen passengers on board arriving ships while officials processed their
admission into the country.96 The first privately owned prison in the United States
was an immigration prison.97 In 1994, in the wake of the above-discussed migration
of Cuban and Haitian migrants and refugees,98 the Corrections Corporation of

93. Madison Pauly, Trump’s Immigration Crackdown Is a Boom Time for Private
Prisons,
MOTHER
JONES
(May–June
2018),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/05/trumps-immigration-crackdown-is-a-boom
-time-for-private-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/95Q8-4DGW].
94. Marouf, supra note 8, at 2142–43 (“On any given day, 37,000 noncitizens are held in
immigration detention centers across the country, of whom 25,000 do not yet have a final order
of removal. Nearly three-quarters of these detainees are held in facilities run by private prison
corporations.”); GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 23, at 15 (“In immigration enforcement,
private prisons have an outsized presence. Sixty-five percent of ICE detainees are held in
private facilities.”).
95. RYO & PEACOCK, supra note 10, at 3 (“Confinement in privately operated facilities .
. . was associated with significantly longer detention.”).
96. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 23, at 24 (“With the federal government’s demand
that ships keep passengers on board, immigration imprisonment had begun, and it started in
the hands of private corporations.”).
97. SILKY SHAH, MARY SMALL & CAROL WU, DET. WATCH NETWORK & CTR. FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, BANKING ON DETENTION: LOCAL LOCKUP QUOTAS AND THE
IMMIGRANT DRAGNET 3 (2015); see Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons,
55 DUKE L.J. 437, 457 (2005). But see id. at 450–452 (discussing eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury leasing and other arrangements between governments and private contractors to
incarcerate people).
98. While the formation of CoreCivic was in response to Cuban and Haitian migration in
the early 1980s, the private prison industry grew out the antebellum practice of forced labor
on prison plantations, which itself grew out of the practice of slavery. Some plantations were
privately owned; others were government-run. All, however, profited from the labor of
enslaved people, primarily from black men. See, e.g., SHANE BAUER, AMERICAN PRISON 19
(2018) (“Like prison systems throughout the South, Texas’s grew directly out of slavery. After
the Civil War the state’s economy was in disarray, and cotton and sugar planters suddenly
found themselves without hands they could force to work. Fortunately for them, the Thirteenth
Amendment, which abolished slavery, left a loophole. It said that ‘neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude’ shall exist in the United States ‘except as punishment for a crime.’ As
long as black men were convicted of crimes, Texas could lease all of its prisoners to private
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America (CCA), now known as CoreCivic,99 opened the Houston Processing Center,
a hotel converted to an immigration detention center, in Houston, Texas.100 CCA cofounder Tom Beasley described on national radio the casual manner in which he
launched his exceedingly profitable business model in partnership with former
pastor101 Don Hutto:
Don Hutto and I went down to Houston on New Year’s Eve in 1983. We
rented a car at the airport and drove around the major thoroughfares to
find somewhere to put 200 illegal criminal aliens by February 1st.
Literally, we stopped in ten motels, then finally about 3am found one that
might work. I asked if they would be interested in selling or leasing the
motel. And after negotiating with the owner for several hours, he finally
agreed.102
Three years later, the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, now known as the
GEO Group, Inc., received its first contract to run an immigration detention center. 103

cotton and sugar plantations and companies running lumber camps and coal mines, and
building railroads. It did this for five decades after the abolition of slavery, but the state
eventually became jealous of the revenue private companies and planters were earning from
its prisoners. So, between 1899 and 1918, the state bought ten plantations of its own and began
running them as prisons.”).
99. Devlin Barrett, Private-Prison Firm CCA to Rename Itself CoreCivic, WALL ST. J.,
(Oct. 28, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/private-prison-firm-cca-to-rename
-itself-corecivic-1477666800 [https://perma.cc/M3BQ-U4W5].
100. SHAH, SMALL & WU, supra note 97, at 3; Christine Bacon, The Evolution of
Immigration Detention in the UK: The Involvement of Private Prison Companies 10 (Refugee
Studies Ctr., Working Paper No. 27, 2005); Madison Pauly, A Brief History of America’s
Private
Prison
Industry,
MOTHER
JONES
(July–Aug.
2016),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/history-of-americas-private-prison-industry
-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/BT82-JCSD].
101. BAUER, supra note 98, at 21 (“Before running prisons, Hutto had been a pastor,
studied history, spent two years in the US Army, and did graduate work in education at the
American University in Washington, DC.”).
102. Bacon, supra note 100, at 10; see also BAUER, supra note 98, at 14–15 (describing
CoreCivic training video: “In the video, Hutto and Beasley tell their company’s origin story.
In 1983, they recount, they won ‘the first contract ever to design, build, finance, and operate a
secure correctional facility in the world.’ . . . [Hutto] recalls the story of obtaining their first
prison contract like an old man giving a blow-by-blow accounting of his winning high school
touchdown. Rushed for time, he and Beasley convinced the owner of a motel in Houston to
lease it to them, eventually hiring ‘all his family’ as staff to seal the deal. They then quickly
surrounded the motel with a twelve-foot fence topped with coiled barbed wire. They left up
the Day Rates Available sign. ‘We opened the facility on Super Bowl Sunday the end of that
January,’ Hutto recalls. ‘So about ten o’clock that night we start receiving inmates. I actually
took their pictures and fingerprinted them. Several other people walked them to their “rooms,”
if you will, and we got our first day’s pay for eighty-seven undocumented aliens.’ Both men
chuckle.”).
103. Pauly, supra note 100.
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And with that, the industry’s two primary players today launched what has become
an empire.104
Immigration confinement is an increasingly lucrative business. 105 In 2018, the
GEO Group reported more than $2.3 billion in revenue, compared to just above $2.2
billion in 2017 and nearly $2.18 billion in 2016.106 CoreCivic reported more than
$1.8 billion in total revenue for 2018 after generating more than $1.7 billion in
2017,107 and reports continued growth through the first quarter of 2019.108 GEO’s
CEO received compensation totaling $7 million in 2018.109 In recent years, often
when the Trump administration announces a new tough-on-immigration policy, these
companies’ shareholders see a rapid spike in stock value. 110 While both GEO and
CoreCivic operate in an array of jurisdictions around the world—they do not profit

104. See, e.g., CARL TAKEI, MICHAEL TAN & JOANNE LIN, ACLU, SHUTTING DOWN THE
PROFITEERS: WHY AND HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY SHOULD STOP USING
PRIVATE PRISONS 10 (2016).
105. See, e.g., SHAH, SMALL & WU, supra note 97, at 3–4; TAKEI, TAN & LIN, supra note
104, at 10 (“These trends have enriched private prison investors. In 2008, the two biggest
private prison companies—Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group
(GEO)—received a combined $307 million in revenue from ICE detention contracts. By 2015,
that number had more than doubled, to more than $765 million.”); Esther Fung, Donald
Trump Has Been Very Good for Publicly Listed Prison Owners, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2019,
9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-has-been-very-good-for-publiclylisted
-prison-owners-11551189601 [https://perma.cc/8CK8-L76U]; Nomaan Merchant, New Deal
Keeps Open Facility That Detains Immigrant Families, AP NEWS (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://www.apnews.com/cfe75057db534f28aecd0a01e04f9786
[https://perma.cc/FX3HBJT8]; Pauly, supra note, 93; Carli Pierson, Don’t Be Fooled by Trump’s Caravan Rhetoric –
It’s Much More Profitable to Incarcerate Migrants Than to Stop Them at the Border,
INDEPENDENT (Oct. 31, 2018, 11:30 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/trumpcaravan-migrants-detention-centres-ice-child-separation-a8610146.html [https://perma.cc/
3727-4JJ]; Jackie Speier, Immigration Detention Is a Profitable Business, S.F. CHRON. (Oct.
24, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/Immigrant-detention-is-aprofitable-business-13334050.php [https://perma.cc/YAL6-NC5L]. But see Danielle C.
Jefferis, Private Prisons, Private Governance: Essay on Developments in Private-Sector
Resistance to Privatized Immigration Detention, 15 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y (forthcoming
2019) (discussing recent developments with respect to financing withdrawal and other privatesector resistance to privatized immigration detention).
106. THE GEO GROUP, INC., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2018).
107. CORECIVIC, INC., CORECIVIC 2018 ANNUAL REPORT: FORM 10-K 54 (2018).
108. Id.
109. Simply Wall St., How Much Is The GEO Group, Inc.’s (NYSE:GEO) CEO Getting
Paid?, YAHOO! FINANCE (May 8, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/much-geo-group
-inc-nyse-163819269.html [https://perma.cc/2WVZ-MY7P].
110. See, e.g., John Washington, Trump’s Immigration Policy ‘Fever Dream,’ THE NATION
(Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/trumps-immigration-policy-fever-dream/
[https://perma.cc/S8JQ-LHTN] (“[B]etween the announcement of the ‘zero tolerance’ policy
and DHS’s June 22 request for information about the possibility of detaining an additional
15,000 people in family jails, the stocks of Geo Group and CoreCivic, the two largest forprofit immigration-detention corporations, increased 5.9 percent and 8.3 percent,
respectively.”).
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exclusively from immigration confinement—their contracts with ICE total
approximately $2 billion each year.111
The driving force behind the private-prison industry’s ballooning profits is ICE’s
“detention quota” system. Since 2007, Congress has appropriated funding for DHS
on the condition that the agency maintains a certain number of detention beds. 112
While the agency is not required to consistently fill the beds, ICE has interpreted the
provision to function as a de facto quota, using it to justify its detention practices. 113
The assumption that all funded detention beds must be filled at all times incentivizes
ICE to arrest and detain whenever possible to fill the beds, many of which are in forprofit prisons. The more beds that are filled, the more the prison corporation collects.
The U.S. system of immigration confinement is unparalleled around the world,
both in its scope and its privatization. Driven by the agency’s perception that every
bed must be filled, ICE continues to arrest and incarcerate more and more people
every year. And with the government’s increasing reliance on for-profit prisons, the
executives and shareholders of the corporations managing those prisons reap
significant monetary rewards, while the people inside the prisons suffer in abysmal
conditions of confinement with few remedies to hold their jailers accountable, as the
next Part demonstrates.
II. THE ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEM: GOVERNMENT-RUN VERSUS FOR-PROFIT
PRISONS
The U.S. Constitution is the nation’s bulwark in ensuring the conditions in which
the government confines people are safe and humane. To be sure, “the Constitution
does not mandate comfortable prisons . . . .”114 But “neither does it permit inhumane
ones . . . .”115 Carceral punishment is bound by “broad and idealistic concepts of
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . . .”116 Those bounds, many of
which are enshrined in the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment,117 ensure the government does not inflict punishments that are

111. See, e.g., John Burnett, Big Money as Private Immigrant Jails Boom, NPR (Nov. 21,
2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/21/565318778/big-money-as-private
-immigrant-jails-boom [https://perma.cc/QEX8-6CXN] (“ICE spends more than $2 billion a
year on immigrant detention through private jails . . . .”).
112. Marouf, supra note 8, at 2145.
113. Id.
114. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).
115. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
116. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571,
579 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968)).
117. This Part focuses on the Eighth Amendment because that provision embodies most of
the Constitution’s substantive due process protections for prisoners and is the one on which
most prisoners rely when seeking to regulate the conditions of their incarceration. See, e.g.,
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849–50 (1998); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 327 (1986). Other Bill of Rights provisions apply in prison as well, though to varying
degrees. See, e.g., Ky. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459–463 (1989)
(discussing prisoners’ procedural due process protections under Fourteenth Amendment);
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (applying First Amendment to prisoner’s speech-related
claims); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (setting forth Fourth Amendment balancing
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“incompatible with ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society’ . . . or which ‘involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain.’”118 And while it is the Fifth Amendment that protects civil, immigration
detainees, many courts have concluded that detainees must be afforded at minimum
the Eighth Amendment’s protections.119
Jurisprudence regarding the application of the Eighth Amendment to carceral
conditions has evolved. Courts have expanded and constricted the contours of the
right, as well as the remedies available to prisoners who prove a violation of the right,
in response to public policies concerning crime, sentencing, and incarceration. But
what has remained constant as the doctrine has developed is that remedies are
available to incarcerated people to address certain elements of their environment that
society deems incompatible with social and constitutional values. Among those
paramount values are the right to adequate medical care and a safe prison
environment.
One of the government’s primary responsibilities in ensuring its carceral
punishment scheme adheres to the Eighth Amendment’s prescription is to “provide
medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.”120 Confinement, by
definition, subjects a person to near-total reliance on the government to meet her
needs: “if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.” 121
In the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce physical torture
or a lingering death, . . . the evils of most immediate concern to the
drafters of the Amendment. In less serious cases, denial of medical care
may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any
penological purpose.122
Such unnecessary suffering, according to the Supreme Court, was long incompatible
with “contemporary standards of decency.”123 Thus, prisons and prison officials who
are deliberately indifferent to a person’s serious medical needs violate the Eighth
Amendment.124
Prisons and prison officials also violate the Eighth Amendment when they fail to
protect a person from violence at the hands of other prisoners.125 “[H]aving stripped
[prisoners] of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to
outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take
its course.”126 Again, a person’s unnecessary suffering, even a person behind prison

test for claims of invasion of privacy).
118. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102–03 (citations omitted).
119. See, e.g., Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2000).
120. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth
Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishment” clause as applicable to the states. See generally
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (tracing history of incorporation of Eighth
Amendment protections).
121. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
122. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 106; see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993).
125. See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1993).
126. Id.
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walls, does not align with contemporary standards of decency.127 Thus, prisons and
prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent
to conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner.128
While the Constitution states no limits on its application of the rights above, the
U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the document’s text in ways that limit the scope
of this protection based on the type of prison a person finds him or herself in. The
consequences of this jurisprudential interpretation fall disproportionately on one
class of prisoners—those in the federal government’s custody but confined in forprofit prisons. People incarcerated in public prisons (that is, the facilities operated
directly by the government), no matter whether they are run by local, state, or federal
authorities, have more robust remedies at their disposal to enforce their rights to
humane conditions of confinement than do federal prisoners in for-profit prisons.
And today, most of those federal prisoners are people held under the federal
government’s so-called civil detention authority for alleged violations of
immigration law.
This Part outlines the constitutional remedies available to prisoners in public
prisons and prisoners in for-profit prisons operating under federal authority. The Part
then concludes by comparing the remedies available to each category of prisoners,
demonstrating the Constitution’s disparate reach.
A. Constitutional Tort Remedies and Government-Run Prisons
Broadly speaking, federal courts have the power to award two types of relief for
violations of the law: money damages for past violations and equitable relief for
ongoing violations (usually in the form of an injunction or declaratory relief). And
this is generally true for people confined in government-run prisons who seek to
enforce their constitutional rights in federal courts: depending on the nature of the
constitutional violation they allege, they may seek relief in the form of monetary
damages and/or equitable relief.
Remedies for constitutional violations are the most robust for state prisoners who
may bring constitutional actions in federal court under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
Congress passed section 1983 “at the height of the tumultuous Reconstruction era
that followed the Civil War . . . to provide a federal forum for civil rights claims.” 129
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for any state prisoner130 seeking to enforce
his constitutional rights against state officials in the form of monetary and equitable

127. Id. (“Prison conditions may be restrictive and even harsh, . . . but gratuitously allowing
the beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no legitimate penological objective.”
(citations and quotations omitted)).
128. Id. at 834.
129. Nicole B. Godfrey, Holding Federal Prison Officials Accountable: The Case for
Recognizing a Damages Remedy for Federal Prisoners’ Free Exercise Claims, 96 NEB. L.
REV. 924, 931 (2018) (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
130. The law is not limited to claims brought by prisoners. Rather, it permits anyone within
the United States to sue government officials acting under color of state or local law for
constitutional violations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191–
192 (1961) (first recognizing availability of damages remedy for actions brought against state
and local officials under Section 1983).
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relief.131 Although the history of section 1983 reaches back to the nineteenth century,
the availability of a constitutional tort remedy for state prison officials’ violations of
prisoners’ constitutional rights has been unquestioned for decades. 132
For federal prisoners in government-run prisons, the remedies are not as robust as
those available to state prisoners under section 1983.133 Federal prisoners may bring
actions in federal court for equitable relief—injunctions and declaratory
judgments—directly under the Constitution, and they may seek damages under
certain “implied” causes of action for constitutional torts. 134 This implied damages
remedy to redress federal officials’ constitutional violations derives from the
Supreme Court’s Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics.135 Explaining the lead-up to Bivens, Professor Nicole B. Godfrey writes,
Prior to Bivens, victims of constitutional violations by federal officers
could seek relief only in state courts through common law suits for
trespass against the federal agents. Yet, by the time Bivens reached the
Court, several flaws in the original model had crystallized.
....
In a 5–3 opinion, the Court held the Constitution itself provides a cause
of action for damages for violations of the Fourth Amendment by
individual federal agents. Specifically, the Court determined that so long
as Congress had not provided an adequate alternative remedy for
violation of the right at issue and so long as there were no special factors
counseling the Court to hesitate acting in an area where Congress had
not, private individuals whose constitutional rights had been violated by
federal officers were entitled to pursue damages remedies in the federal
courts.136

131. The sweeping scope of Section 1983 is worth repeating. The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
132. See id. at 931 (“While § 1983 lay largely dormant for just under a century, the
legislative history makes clear Congress intended the law provide monetary relief to victims
of constitutional rights violations by state and local authorities.”).
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (applies only to officials acting under color of state or local
law).
134. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
396–97 (1971).
135. 403 U.S. at 389.
136. Godfrey, supra note 129, at 932–34 (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
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Since Bivens, the Supreme Court has expanded the damages remedy in two other
contexts, one of which is especially significant to federal prisoners. 137 In Carlson v.
Green, the mother of a prisoner who died while in Federal Bureau of Prisons custody
due to inadequate medical care sued federal prison officials on behalf of the
prisoner’s estate for the injuries her son endured while in their custody. 138 After
assessing whether any special factors counseled hesitation in recognizing a damages
remedy, and analyzing whether Congress had created any adequate alternative
remedies,139 the Court concluded the plaintiff could pursue a damages remedy for the
constitutional tort.140 Carlson has been a landmark holding for federal prisoners
seeking to enforce their Eighth-Amendment right to adequate medical care.
Since Carlson, however, the Court has been increasingly reluctant to extend
Bivens further.141 The recent decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi brings the future of Bivens
squarely into question.142 A full analysis of Ziglar and the future of Bivens is beyond
the scope of this Article. What remains the case, however, is federal prisoners
confined in government-run prisons still have a tort remedy available to them for
certain constitutional rights violations.
B. Constitutional Tort Remedies and Private Prisons
Two of the Court’s post-Bivens decisions limited the availability of constitutional
tort remedies for prisoners confined in for-profit prisons while in the federal

137. Id. at 934–35 (“In the period immediately following Bivens, both the Supreme Court
and the lower federal courts extended the Bivens remedy to other constitutional violations.
Notably, the federal courts extended Bivens to First Amendment Free Speech claims, First
Amendment Freedom of Association claims, Fifth Amendment Equal Protection claims, Fifth
Amendment Due Process claims, Sixth Amendment right-to-an-attorney claims, and Eighth
Amendment prison-conditions claims. Of these, the Supreme Court itself expressly expanded
Bivens to include employment-discrimination claims brought under an Equal Protection theory
encompassed by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and cruel-and-unusualconditions claims brought under the Eighth Amendment.”) (footnotes omitted).
138. 446 U.S. 14, 16 (1980).
139. See Godfrey, supra note 129, at 936–37.
140. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18–23, 25.
141. Godfrey, supra note 129, at 937 (“Despite the Court’s unequivocal articulation of the
need for a Bivens remedy in Carlson, the three-plus decades since Carlson reveal a Court
reluctant to extend Bivens to new contexts. In some instances, the Court determined special
factors exist which preclude an extension of Bivens. . . . In other instances, the Court conflated
the special-factors exception and the adequate-alternative-remedy exception to conclude the
existence of a congressional statute in a particular area is itself a factor ‘counseling judicial
hesitation.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421–22 (1988)
(“Our more recent decisions have responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens remedies
be extended into new contexts. The absence of statutory relief for a constitutional violation,
for example, does not by any means necessarily imply that courts should award money
damages against the officers responsible for the violation.”).
142. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
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government’s custody:143 Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko144 and
Minneci v. Pollard.145
In Malesko, the plaintiff, John Malesko, was a federal prisoner in the custody of
the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) who was designated to wait out the remainder
of his criminal sentence in the Le Marquis Community Correctional Center (Le
Marquis), a New York City halfway house146 operated by the for-profit prison
company, Correctional Services Corporation (CSC).147 While in BOP custody, Mr.
Malesko was diagnosed with a heart condition, for which he was prescribed
medication.148 Because of his condition, Mr. Malesko was not supposed to engage in
physical activity, including climbing stairs.149 Once he arrived at Le Marquis,
however, halfway house officials assigned him to a room on the fifth floor and
precluded him from using the elevator to reach his room from the lobby. 150 While
climbing the five flights of stairs on one occasion, Mr. Malesko suffered a heart

143. Although the focus of this Article is on people in for-profit immigration prisons,
federal prisoners waiting out a criminal sentence in private federal prisons also do not have a
constitutional tort remedy at their disposal to address past violations of their rights. This is one
example in the ever-expanding field of the ways in which federal prisoners are disadvantaged
as compared to their state and local counterparts. A full discussion of this phenomenon is
beyond the scope of this Article; I and others, however, have addressed aspects of the disparate
treatment of federal prisoners in other work. See generally Godfrey, supra note 129, at 974
(“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment rightly requires the states to protect and secure the individual
rights and liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights in the same way it requires the federal
government to do so. . . . [B]y imposing inconsistent remedial consequences for violations of
those rights on state actors vis-à-vis federal actors, the federal courts ignore constitutional
history and design meant to protect individuals from rights infringement by the federal
government. In the prison setting, this results in federal prison officials escaping with no
repercussions for violations of federally protected constitutional rights while state prison
officials are held liable for the very same acts. Such a result stands constitutional design on its
head . . . .”); Danielle C. Jefferis & Nicole B. Godfrey, Chapman v. Bureau of Prisons:
Stopping the Venue Merry-Go-Round, 96 DENV. L. REV. F. 9, 9 (2018) (“The Federal Bureau
of Prisons (BOP) is in a unique position to frustrate the federal venue statute. In contrast to
most state departments of corrections, the BOP bears the unilateral power to transfer prisoners
in its custody to prisons across federal judicial districts.”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 16 (“The
consequences of this practice are significant; often, it risks leaving the prisoner-plaintiff in a
district in which he does not have the means to continue to litigate his claim and, thus, permits
the BOP to evade judicial review.”) (footnotes omitted); Allison L. Waks, Federal
Incarceration by Contract in a Post-Minneci World: Legislation to Equalize the
Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1065, 1066 (2013) (“The
privatization of prisons has stripped certain federal prisoners of the ability to seek redress for
violations of their constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment.”).
144. 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
145. 565 U.S. 118 (2012).
146. For purposes of this discussion, a halfway house is treated just like a prison. While
people assigned to a halfway house are under fewer liberty restrictions, they are nonetheless
still in government custody and under government supervision.
147. 534 U.S. at 63–64.
148. Id. at 64.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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attack, fell, and injured himself.151 Several days prior to the fall, Mr. Malesko alleged,
CSC staff had failed to refill his prescription medication.152
Mr. Malesko filed a pro se action against CSC and several of its employees. 153
The district court dismissed the claim against the individual employees on statute of
limitations grounds,154 so by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the
question presented was “whether the implied damages action first recognized in
Bivens . . . should be extended to allow recovery against a private corporation
operating a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of Prisons.”155
In a 5–4 decision authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court refused to extend
Bivens to constitutional tort claims brought against private prison corporations. 156
First, relying on FDIC v. Meyer,157 the Court reasoned the core purpose of Bivens is
to deter the officer who violates the constitutional right at issue, not the entity
employing the officer.158 In FDIC, the Court recounted,
We reasoned that if given the choice, plaintiffs would sue a federal
agency instead of an individual who could assert qualified immunity as

151. Id.
152. Malesko v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 229 F.3d 374, 376 (2d Cir. 2000).
153. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 64.
154. Id. at 65.
155. Id. at 63 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
156. Id. (“We decide here whether the implied damages action first recognized in Bivens .
. . should be extended to allow recovery against a private corporation operating a halfway
house under contract with the Bureau of Prisons. We decline to so extend Bivens.”) (citation
omitted). Whether the Court should have even reached this question is, itself, questionable.
According to the Court, Mr. Malesko’s complaint alleged CSC and the other defendants were
“negligent in failing to obtain requisite medication for [respondent’s] condition and were
further negligent by refusing [respondent] the use of the elevator.” Id. at 64–65 (quoting
appellate record). The district court treated the complaint as raising claims under Bivens,
despite the fact that Mr. Malesko plead negligence. See id. at 65. The Eighth Amendment’s
standard for inadequate medical care has always been greater than negligence. See Estelle, 429
U.S. at 105–106 (“[I]n the medical context, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical
care cannot be said to constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ or to be
‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’ Thus, a complaint that a physician has been
negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical
mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”). However, one reason the
Court declined to extend the Bivens remedy was the availability of alternative remedies to Mr.
Malesko: “[F]ederal prisoners in private facilities enjoy a parallel tort remedy that is
unavailable to prisoners housed in Government facilities. . . . This case demonstrates as much,
since respondent’s complaint in the District Court arguably alleged no more than a
quintessential claim of negligence.” Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72–73 (citation omitted). The Court
suggested the district court’s construction of Mr. Malesko’s complaint as one brought under
the Eighth Amendment may have been wrong but then stated Mr. Malesko “accepted this
theory of liability, and he has never sought relief on any other ground.” Id. at 73. Had the
district court adhered to the liberal construction canon for pro se litigants, Mr. Malesko may
have prevailed.
157. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
158. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69 (citing Meyer, 510 U.S. at 484–86).
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an affirmative defense. To the extent aggrieved parties had less incentive
to bring a damages claim against individuals, “the deterrent effects of the
Bivens remedy would be lost.”159
Second, the Court noted that Mr. Malesko and other federal prisoners like him
have alternative remedies available to redress injuries in federal court: “It was
conceded at oral argument that alternative remedies are at least as great, and in many
respects greater, than anything that could be had under Bivens.”160 For the Court,
these adequate alternative remedies include a state tort negligence action, a federal
suit for injunctive relief, and the BOP’s grievance program. 161 According to the
Court, the availability of these purported alternative remedies to a constitutional tort
made Mr. Malesko’s situation “altogether different from Bivens, in which [the Court]
found alternative state tort remedies to be ‘inconsistent or even hostile’ to a remedy
inferred from the Fourth Amendment.”162
According to the Malesko Court, Mr. Bivens may not have had a choice to resist
the requests of federal law enforcement officers knocking on his door; doing so may
have implicated criminal charges.163 But not resisting their requests—letting them
into his home—likely defeated any state tort remedies he would have had against
those officers, such as trespass or invasion of privacy. 164 Mr. Bivens, therefore, did
not have the option to pursue alternative state tort remedies for the officers’ wrongful
conduct, so recognition of the implied constitutional action was warranted. 165 Mr.
Malesko, in contrast, must merely make a “strategic choice” between pursuing a
constitutional claim for deliberate indifference and a state tort claim for negligence.
In that situation, the state tort claim is an adequate alternative to the implied
constitutional tort.166
Accordingly, Mr. Malesko was “not a plaintiff in search of a remedy.” 167 Rather,
he sought “a marked extension of Bivens, to contexts that would not advance Bivens’
core purpose of deterring individual officers from engaging in unconstitutional
wrongdoing. The caution toward extending Bivens remedies into any new context, a
caution consistently and repeatedly recognized for three decades, forecloses such an
extension here.”168 Mr. Malesko’s constitutional tort claim against the for-profit
prison corporation that confined him when he suffered his injury was dismissed. 169

159. Id. (quoting Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485).
160. Id. at 72.
161. Id. at 72–74.
162. Id. at 73 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 394 (1971)).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (“Therefore, we reasoned in Bivens that other than an implied constitutional tort
remedy, ‘there remain[ed] . . . but the alternative of resistance, which may amount to a
crime.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395).
166. Id. at 73–74 (“Such logic [from Bivens] does not apply to [Mr. Malesko], whose claim
of negligence or deliberate indifference requires no resistance to official action, and whose
lack of alternative tort remedies was due solely to strategic choice.”).
167. Id. at 74.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 65–66.
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The next case before the Court concerning the liability of for-profit prisons and
federal prisoners was Minneci v. Pollard.170 In Minneci, the question presented for
the Court was “whether [to] imply the existence of an Eighth Amendment-based
damages action (a Bivens action) against employees of a privately operated federal
prison.”171 In yet another blow to the constitutional rights of federal prisoners in
private prisons, the Court resolved the circuit court split on the issue in the
negative.172
Mr. Pollard was a federal prisoner confined in a facility owned and operated by
the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, now known as GEO.173 He slipped on a cart
left in a doorway in the prison and, as he later learned, broke both elbows.174 Mr.
Pollard sued Wackenhut employees working in the prison for varying ways in which,
he alleged, the employees violated his Eighth Amendment rights while he was
injured.175
Mr. Pollard argued there was no need for the Court to ask whether an extension
of Bivens was warranted because the Court had already decided in Carlson that
federal prisoners may bring an Eighth Amendment claim against prison officials.176
This premise—that federal prisoners are federal prisoners, no matter the type of
facility in which they are confined (which is typically through no choice of their
own)—was not as obvious to the Court. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority,
stated, “Carlson . . . was a case in which a federal prisoner sought damages from
personnel employed by the government, not personnel employed by a private firm.
And for present purposes that fact—of employment status—makes a critical
difference.”177
The critical difference was, similar to in Malesko, the existence of adequate
alternative state tort remedies.178 The Court acknowledged state torts may not be on
par with constitutional tort remedies but discounted that disparity quickly, finding
that state tort law remedies provide “roughly similar incentives” for potential
defendants to comply with the law and “roughly similar compensation” for victims
of violations as constitutional torts do.179 In dispensing with the claim, the Court
nodded to Mr. Pollard’s argument that there “may” be situations in which state tort
law does not cover Eighth Amendment violations but dispensed with the notion
quickly, concluding the issue of the adequacy of state tort law as a substitute for
constitutional claims was better left “to another day.” 180 Accordingly, a federal
prisoner confined in a for-profit prison may not bring a constitutional tort action

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

565 U.S. 118 (2012).
Id. at 120.
Id. at 122, 125 (“[W]e conclude that Pollard cannot assert a Bivens claim.”).
Id. at 121. See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text.
565 U.S. at 121.
Id. at 121–22.
Id. at 126.
Id. (citing Carlson v. Green 446 U.S. 14, 25 (1980)).
Id. at 127.
Id. at 130.
Id.
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against the employees of the prison corporation for violating his rights; his remedies
are relegated to state tort law.181
With these two decisions, the Court carved out a class of prisoners for whom there
is no constitutional tort remedy. Effectively, the Court marked these prisoners as
those to whom the Constitution does not apply. The decisions dealt with
constitutional tort claims brought by federal prisoners waiting out a sentence in forprofit prisons after a criminal conviction. But in the years since the decisions, another
class of prisoners has grown increasingly relevant—those held in for-profit prisons
by federal immigration authorities—and they, likewise, are left with no constitutional
tort remedy to seek redress of violations of their rights in custody.
C. “Incongruous and Confusing”
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Malesko, predicted that recognizing different
constitutional standards for federal prisoners based purely on the type of prison
confining them would be “incongruous and confusing.”182 Justice Ginsburg,
dissenting in Minneci, echoed these concerns: “Were Pollard incarcerated in a
federal- or state-operated facility, he would have a federal remedy for the Eighth
Amendment violations he allege[d]. . . . I would not deny the same character of relief
to Pollard, a prisoner placed by federal contract in a privately operated prison.”183
Yet, this incongruous and confusing space is exactly where the state of the law for
federal prisoners—including those in ICE custody—lies. The Eighth Amendment
protects federal prisoners in the same way it protects state prisoners, and people in
ICE custody are entitled to at least the same measure of constitutional protection.184
Yet, the mechanisms for enforcing those rights markedly differ depending solely on
the entity running the site of the constitutional violations.
Roberto’s story at the outset of this Article is just one among many people’s
struggles to obtain adequate medical care in private immigration detention facilities.
Others have fared worse in recent months, succumbing to limb amputations, serious
illnesses and infections, and even death.185 ICE has acknowledged at least 185 deaths

181. Id. at 131 (“For these reasons, where, as here, a federal prisoner seeks damages from
privately employed personnel working at a privately operated federal prison, where the
conduct allegedly amounts to a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and where that conduct is
of a kind that typically falls within the scope of traditional state tort law (such as the conduct
involving improper medical care at issue here), the prisoner must seek a remedy under state
tort law. We cannot imply a Bivens remedy in such a case.”) (emphasis added).
182. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 82 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“The Court, however, has recognized sound jurisprudential reasons for parallelism [between
Section 1983 and Bivens], as different standards for claims against state and federal actors
‘would be incongruous and confusing.’”).
183. Minneci, 565 U.S. at 132 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
184. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 165 (3d Cir. 2005) (relying on Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), to conclude pretrial detainees are entitled to greater protections
than those afforded under Eighth Amendment).
185. See, e.g., Conor McCormick-Cavanagh, Democrats Probe ICE About Medical
Conditions at Aurora Detention Facility, WESTWORD (Feb. 28, 2019, 1:54 PM),
https://www.westword.com/news/jason-crow-sends-ice-letter-about-medical-conditions-at
-aurora-detention-facility-11252339 [https://perma.cc/EYE2-CJNR]; Kassi Nelson, Trans
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in immigration prisons and jails between October 2003 and July 2018.186 Twentytwo people have died in ICE custody in the last two years.187 Others, still, have
endured physical abuse at the hands of staff and otherwise harsh conditions of
confinement.188 If Roberto had found himself in a facility run directly by ICE or in a
state or local facility contracting with ICE—that is, a government-run prison—he
would have had legal options to pursue relief against the personnel who were
responsible for his suffering. But because Roberto happened to find himself in a
private facility, he was relegated to state court remedies. Roberto’s and his
counterparts’ remedies are incongruous and confusing; the for-profit prisons and
their staff are constitutionally unaccountable.
III. THE NEED TO CONSTITUTIONALIZE PRIVATE IMMIGRATION DETENTION
There is little to no tangible difference in the experience of people in for-profit,
federal immigration detention and people incarcerated in federal and state prisons
and local jails.189 The latter is held to a constitutional standard; the former is not. But

Woman Dies in ICE Custody; Family Sues, KOB4 (Nov. 27, 2018, 4:13 PM),
https://www.kob.com/albuquerque-news/trans-woman-dies-after-detained-at-new-mexico
-ice-facility/5157737/ [https://perma.cc/U9E2-U485]; Madison Pauly, A Private Prison
Company Says Georgia’s Investigation into a Detainee’s Death Must Stay Secret, MOTHER
JONES (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/11/corecivic
-immigration-detention-suicide-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/8EYR-DKQE]; Lisa Riordan
Seville, Hannah Rappleye & Andrew W. Lehren, 22 Immigrants Died in ICE Detention
Centers During the Past 2 Years, NBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2019, 7:10 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/22-immigrants-died-ice-detention-centers
-during-past-2-years-n954781 [https://perma.cc/5UH6-VG93]; Chris Walker, ICE Defends a
Chicken Pox Quarantine at Immigrant Detention Facility in Aurora, WESTWORD (Oct. 25,
2018, 3:27 PM), https://www.westword.com/news/varicella-outbreak-leads-to-a-quarantine
-at-ice-detention-center-in-aurora-10941507 [https://perma.cc/GG7A-T64L]; Chris Walker,
There’s Been Another Chicken Pox Outbreak at Immigrant Detention Facility, WESTWORD
(Jan. 31, 2019, 1:47 PM), https://www.westword.com/news/second-chicken-pox-outbreak-at
-aurora-immigrant-detention-center-puts-two-pods-in-quarantine-11210867 [https://perma.cc
/WL46-9BQ2]. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CODE RED: THE FATAL CONSEQUENCES
OF DANGEROUSLY SUBSTANDARD MEDICAL CARE IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2018),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/us0618_immigration_web2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2KUQ-8R9P].
186. RYO & PEACOCK, supra note 10, at 5.
187. Seville, Rappleye & Lehren, supra note 185.
188. See, e.g., Nina Shapiro, What Happened to Mergensana Amar? The Russian
Immigrant’s Handwritten Note Raises Questions About Treatment at Northwest Detention
Center, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 30, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/russian-immigrants-handwritten-note-leaves-many-questions-about-treatment-at
-northwest-detention-center/ [https://perma.cc/X3KF-J6LB].
189. See García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1383–84 (“In addition to detaining many more
people under immigration law authority, the United States relies heavily on detention facilities
that resemble the nation’s penal institutions. Both are secure environments in which guards
monitor each resident’s movements. Meals, personal and legal visits, access to medical
providers, and every other aspect of social life are regulated.”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 1387
(“From the perspective of individuals confined in immigration detention centers, the civil or
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conditions in for-profit immigration prisons and jails are comparable—if not
worse—than conditions in federal and state prisons and local jails across the
country.190 Invasive strip searches, restricted and controlled movement, round-theclock monitoring, overuse of solitary confinement: these are all features of criminaland immigration-related incarceration, all features in government-run and for-profit
prisons.191 Why, then, should the law not permit people in for-profit immigration
prisons and jails to assert and vindicate their constitutional rights for past harms in
federal court, in at least the same manner in which it permits people incarcerated in
federal and state government-run prisons to do?
From a constitutional values and goals perspective, there is no defensible answer
to this question. This is so for three primary reasons: First, the theories underpinning
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Malesko and Minneci, as outlined above, fail to
contemplate the dignity principle that underpins our nation’s constitutional norms,
particularly with respect to confinement and incarceration. Second, the MaleskoMinneci doctrine fails to consider the inherently governmental function of
incarceration. And third, the doctrine neglects the constitutional goals of government
transparency and accountability.

criminal distinction is easily lost. Detainees regularly envision themselves as confined.”)
(footnote omitted); Lima-Marín & Jefferis, supra note 6, at 7 (“[D]eaths due to poor medical
care and suicide in immigration confinement are on the rise. ICE has reported more than
seventy-four deaths in immigration detention since 2010. The agency reported six deaths in
fiscal year 2018, albeit in dubiously incomplete fashion. People refer to many immigration
detention facilities as kennels because prisoners are held in chain-link cages and treated like
animals by facility staff. Lights are left on in housing units constantly, making sleep difficult
for many prisoners. In many facilities, people have no choice but to sleep on the concrete
floor.”) (footnotes omitted).
190. See García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1384 (“Meanwhile, the most invasive features
of penal imprisonment resonate through the immigration detention estate.”); Lima-Marín &
Jefferis, supra note 6, at 8–9 (“There is little meaningful difference in the lived experiences of
incarceration under a government’s criminal legal powers and its civil confinement. . . . In
some situations, the immigration detention experience is even more punitive than
incarceration.”).
191. See García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1384–85 (“[T]he most invasive features of
penal imprisonment resonate through the immigration detention estate. Some individuals have
been subjected to strip searches upon being taken into immigration custody pursuant to
institutional policies requiring strip searches of all inmates. Most are required to wear uniforms
color-coded to their security classification. Movements around the grounds are tightly limited
and observed by guards; many detainees must spend ‘all or most of the day in their housing
units,’ with as little as one hour of recreation time. Visits from family and friends are limited
to thirty minutes a few days a week and contact is prohibited (detainees and visitors speak
through telephones while separated by Plexiglas dividers). One facility prohibits contact visits
even with attorneys. Others are reportedly placed in solitary confinement where they are
locked in cells for twenty-three hours a day without contact with other detainees. A recent
review of government data reported that several dozen were held in solitary confinement for
more than seventy-five days, well above the fifteen days that a United Nations representative
found to be the point at which ‘some of the harmful psychological effects of isolation can
become irreversible.”); Lima-Marín & Jefferis, supra note 6, at 8–10 (discussing first-hand
experience of criminal incarceration and immigration confinement).
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Underneath each of these considerations is the premise that the disparate
classification of people incarcerated for punishment and people confined pursuant to
the federal government’s immigration-enforcement authority—that is, the law’s
distinction between punitive incarceration and civil detention—may no longer be
justifiable.192 While the nature of the legal frameworks under which the government
imposes confinement differ, the conditions in immigration detention, and the
experiences of the people who are incarcerated, are inherently carceral. 193 And there
are questions as to whether nonpunitive incarceration is even possible. 194 While I
reserve a full exploration of this concept for future work,195 I call this two-pronged
faulty premise the “civil detention fallacy:”196 the current state of immigration
detention is nothing close to civil, and the entire act of confining a person civilly may
be impossible. Both considerations demonstrate that when it comes to conditions of
confinement in the United States, there is no meaningful difference between criminal
incarceration and immigration confinement. Therefore, the same values that form the
foundation of our constitutional jurisprudence regulating criminal incarceration—
namely, dignity, the inherently governmental function of incarceration, and the need
for transparency and accountability—must allow for a constitutional tort remedy for
people whose rights are violated in for-profit immigration prisons. 197
A. Dignity as a Constitutional Value
Dignity exists at the heart of the Constitution. Time and again, the Supreme Court
has stated that constitutional protections of prisoners are girded by the concept that
all people bear dignity, no matter their station in life:198 “By protecting even those
convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the

192. Lima-Marín & Jefferis, supra note 6, at 12–14.
193. Id.; see also García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1382–1388.
194. See Lima-Marín & Jefferis, supra note 6, at 12–13 (“With the exception of the death
penalty, incarceration is the most extreme form of punishment that modern, democratic
societies tolerate. Physical confinement is so inextricably intertwined with punitive authority
that it has become, for most liberal governments, the definition of punishment.”).
195. Jefferis, supra note 6.
196. Id.
197. See García Hernández, supra note 9, at 1393 (“Imprisonment is unquestionably an
awesome power that the government is authorized to wield in limited circumstances. To
reduce the incidence of abuse by government officials, the U.S. Constitution imposes
significant procedural obstacles to imprisonment. If immigration detention is to be
reconceptualized as punishment, then it becomes necessary to consider the logical legal
outcome: Imposition of punishment would be subject to the constitutional constraints on
governmental action that apply to all criminal prosecutions.”) (footnotes omitted).
198. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 708 (2014) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
560 (2005)); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“The basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”). See generally Meghan J. Ryan,
Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the Backdrop of the Eighth Amendment, 2016 U. ILL. L.
REV. 2129, 2141–42 (2016) (“Since 1958, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments is focused on preserving the
dignity of man. . . . Overall, the Court has remained quite consistent in tying the Eighth
Amendment to this concept of dignity.”).
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government to respect the dignity of all persons.”199 “Prisoners retain the essence of
human dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”200 The Eighth
Amendment “embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,
humanity, and decency . . . .”201 All of the constitutional jurisprudence derived from
the Eighth Amendment is animated, at least in part, by this fundamental recognition:
no matter the brutality of the crimes for which a person is convicted, he nevertheless
is still a human being, and the government must treat him as such.
Despite decades of reliance on the dignity principle, there has been little
consistency in the understanding of this concept and the values animating it. 202
Professor Meghan J. Ryan traces the development of scholarly attention to
constitutional dignity, explaining that some scholars have focused on the Kantian
conception of dignity, which focuses on the individual. 203 Others have asserted the
Eighth Amendment’s concept of dignity focuses rather on society—a form of
“collective . . . dignity.”204 For the scholars on this latter side of the debate, dignity
focuses “on what society has deemed ‘civilized, decent, and virtuous.’” 205 After
engaging in an in-depth analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence on the issue, Professor
Ryan concludes the “core of the Eighth Amendment dignity demand” is, in fact, the
individual person.206 Under this formulation, the dignity principle is a manifestation
of the right to self-determination—that is, the reflection of every human being’s
autonomy and self-worth.207 The right to dignity is a “pivotal right deeply rooted in
any notion of justice, fairness, and a society based on basic rights.” 208
Surely, the fundamental nature of dignity—recognized in all people, “even those
convicted of heinous crimes”209—applies with at least equal force to people in
immigration confinement. If the Court is going to regulate the constitutionality of
penal prisons and prison conditions with dignity in mind, it must do the same for
immigration prisons, including those prisons managed and operated by for-profit
companies. Without a remedy to redress violations of that principle, however,
prisoners whose rights and, accordingly, dignity were violated have no means to
present these claims to the federal courts. And without a remedy, the right means
very little.210

199. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
200. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011) (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
311 (2002)).
201. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (citation and quotations omitted).
202. Ryan, supra note 198 at 2142.
203. Id. at 2142–43.
204. Id. at 2143.
205. Id. at 2144.
206. Id. at 2167, 2178 (“The core of the Eighth Amendment focuses on the dignity of the
[person]. This translates into recognizing and safeguarding the individual in punishing.”).
207. Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 67–68 (2011).
208. Id. at 69 (internal quotations omitted).
209. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
210. As James Madison wrote, “But a right implies a remedy . . . .” THE FEDERALIST NO.
43, at 237 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
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B. Incarceration as a Constitutional Function
In principle, incarceration is an inherently constitutional—or public—function. 211
That is, from a moral and philosophical view, depriving a person of his liberty for
purposes of punishment is something only a government may rightfully do.212
Delegating that responsibility “represents the government’s abdication of one of its
most basic responsibilities to its people.”213 Indeed, delegating this necessarily public
function with few mechanisms in place to hold the private actors accountable
eviscerates the oversight and accountability structure inherent to the U.S. system of
government, with coequal branches of government imposing checks and balances on
each other in furtherance of adhering to constitutional standards and norms. By not
permitting prisoners to assert constitutional tort claims against private prison
officials, the government evades responsibility for one of its core functions.
C. Transparency and Accountability as Constitutional Goals
Prisons are opaque institutions.214 Prisoners exist behind locked gates and barbed
wire, on the other side of iron bars and steel doors. Journalists and lawmakers are
often refused access; the public (excluding attorneys meeting with clients) almost
certainly is not permitted inside most facilities to inspect the conditions or speak with
prisoners.215 Acquiring information about the conditions inside prisons is inherently

211. See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 97 at 442–43 (compiling literature among privateprison critics relying on incarceration and punishment as inherently public function).
212. Federal law as it has been interpreted does not view incarceration as inherently
governmental, however, which is in part the reason for the flourishing private-prison industry.
There are compelling reasons for a reinterpretation of this principle. See generally Fiona
O’Carroll, Inherently Governmental: A Legal Argument for Ending Private Federal Prisons
and Detention Centers, 67 EMORY L.J. 293 (2017).
213. Joseph E. Field, Making Prisons Private: An Improper Delegation of a Governmental
Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649, 668 (1987).
214. See, e.g., Andrea C. Armstrong, No Prisoner Left Behind? Enhancing Public
Transparency of Penal Institutions, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 435, 436 (2014) (“The public
has little idea what happens behind prison walls. Prisons and jails are essentially ‘closed
institutions holding an ever-growing disempowered population.’”); Derek Borchardt, The Iron
Curtain Redrawn Between Prisoners and the Constitution, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 469,
469 (2012) (“For much of American history, federal courts considered prisons’ internal
operations off limits.”); David C. Fathi, The Challenge of Prison Oversight, 47 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1453, 1453 (2010) (“Prisons are closed environments, largely hidden from public
view.”); Laura Rovner, On Litigating Constitutional Challenges to the Federal Supermax:
Improving Conditions and Shining a Light, 95 DENV. L. REV. 457, 472–73 (2018).
215. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 214, at 462 (“Currently, prisons and jails are
shrouded in secrecy. Media access to prisoners and prisons is extremely limited and
completely discretionary. Moreover, investigative reporting is generally in decline given the
changing nature of media, news, and reporting. In combination with the high barriers to
obtaining prison related information, media coverage is less able to fill the prison transparency
gap.”); Fathi, supra note 214, at 1453 (“For obvious reasons, the public and press cannot be
allowed the same degree of access to prisons as they are allowed to other government facilities,
and security concerns require some monitoring and control of contacts between prisoners and
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difficult.216 Recounting the struggles of prisoners to shine a light on their conditions
of confinement, Professor Laura Rovner offers two quotes from prisoners that make
this point especially poignant:
The law does forbid the methodological use of torture. . . . [B]ut how can
anyone prove such practices exist when only convicts witness it? 217
and
We inmates look to the public as sheep look toward their shepherd, we’re
crying wolf but you don’t see him. That doesn’t mean the wolf’s not
there. He’s just wearing sheep’s clothing so you don’t see him. We can’t
understand why you don’t see him but we see him and we smell him, and
he stinks like death and repression.218
The Constitution provides one key mechanism,219 however, with which to shine a
light on prisons, expose the conditions inside the facilities, and, if necessary, impose
change to ensure U.S. prisons adhere to constitutional norms. 220 Professor Rovner
describes the many ways in which constitutional litigation exposed conditions inside
the federal government’s supermax prison in Florence, Colorado—the U.S.

the outside world.”); Kara Mason, Aurora ICE Prison Refuses to Let Congressman, City
Lawmaker
in
for
Unannounced
Tour,
SENTINEL
(Feb.
20,
2019),
https://www.sentinelcolorado.com/news/metro/aurora-ice-prison-refuses-to-let
-congressman-city-lawmaker-in-for-unannounced-tour/
[https://perma.cc/RS9Z-ATSW];
Rovner, supra note 214, at 472 (“Journalists similarly have been prevented from accessing
ADX. The Amnesty International report, citing a Westword article from 2007, noted that ‘from
January 2002 through May 2007, officials denied every single media request for face-to-face
interviews with ADX prisoners, or tours of the facility. . . .’ Only after mounting ‘criticism of
lack of access’ did the BOP arrange a restricted tour of the prison in 2007 for some journalists
with major media outlets. But, the Report noted, ‘no similar tours are believed to have been
arranged since then.’”).
216. See Rovner, supra note 214, at 470–71.
217. Id. at 470 (alteration in original).
218. Id. at 471.
219. Of course, even for the prisoners for whom the law permits a constitutional tort
remedy, the Constitution is not as robust as it should be due to laws designed to limit prisoner
litigation, including notably the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See generally Fathi, supra note
214; Mike Tartaglia, Private Prisons, Private Records, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1689, 1693 (2014)
(“Litigation has historically been the most common and effective means of improving prison
operations and conditions, but its effectiveness in recent years has been curtailed by statutory
reform and judicially imposed limitations. Over the past two decades, the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”) drastically restricted judicial prison oversight and the ability of
prisoners to file suit.”) (footnotes omitted).
220. See Borchardt, supra note 214, at 469 (“But in the 1960s and 1970s, courts began to
look inside prison walls. They were shocked by what they saw. Courts declared some prisons
to be ‘unfit for human habitation,’ ‘a dark and evil world completely alien to the free world,’
and ‘so inhumane and degrading as to amount to cruel and unusual punishment.’”) (footnotes
omitted); Rovner, supra note 214, at 481–82.
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Penitentiary Administrative Maximum, also known as ADX.221 After explaining how
difficult breaking through the shroud of secrecy over ADX is for journalists, family
members of men confined inside, and members of the public, she asserts
constitutional litigation “is all the more necessary when the prison in question is, like
ADX, so deeply shrouded in secrecy.”222 For centuries, unspeakable abuse of men
and women has been allowed to happen behind prison walls because the public had
no access, and still, the cloak of secrecy over America’s prisons in part permits the
abuse to continue. “[L]itigation, however difficult or imperfect a tool, is a critically
important one, not only as a mechanism for vindicating rights violations, but also
because of its capacity to bring some of what has been kept in darkness into the
light.”223
As the federal government’s “most secure prison,” ADX is notoriously difficult
to penetrate.224 For-profit immigration prisons are likewise impervious, though for
different reasons.225 The scope of immigration detention has grown substantially in
recent years, but information about the conditions inside the prisons is often hard to
come by. One primary reason for this opaqueness is that unlike government-run
prisons, open records laws do not apply to private prisons. 226 Journalists, advocates,
and others have no legal mechanism with which to demand private companies’
records concerning the conditions inside the facilities. Constitutional litigation,
therefore, effectuates dual mutually reinforcing purposes: bringing claims for
violations of constitutional rights against prison officials shines a light on the
conditions inside prisons, and shining a light on the conditions inside prisons
reinvigorates—and sometimes reimposes—constitutional standards on the
facilities.227
If the law permitted a prisoner confined in a for-profit immigration prison to bring
a constitutional tort claim against the facility doctor who ignored his pleas for
medical treatment, for example, the litigation would serve each of these three
constitutional aims: Asserting a constitutional tort claim against the doctor reaffirms
that person’s fundamental dignity—the Constitution applies to him, too. Holding the

221. See generally Rovner, supra note 214.
222. Id. at 481.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 465.
225. See Fathi, supra note 214, at 1461–62 (“Private facilities present a special oversight
problem. While the profit motive may increase the temptation to cut corners on staffing,
medical care, and other essential services, private prisons are subject to even less scrutiny than
their public counterparts.”).
226. Id. at 1462 (“As private corporations, they are typically not subject to open meeting
and freedom of information laws that apply to state and local departments of corrections.”);
Tartaglia, supra note 219, at 1691 (“In the vast majority of United States jurisdictions, private
prisons are not required to disclose information pursuant to public records requests in the same
manner as government prisons.”).
227. See, e.g., Tartaglia, supra note 219, at 1699 (“Transparency enhances accountability
by permitting interested parties to focus more attention on government operations. In the
prison context, information about things like staffing ratios, provision of medical and mental
health care, use of solitary confinement, rates of violence, and protection of prisoners’
fundamental rights such as access to the courts and correspondence with the outside world can
she much-needed light on prison conditions and operations.”) (footnotes omitted).
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private prison’s doctor to constitutional standards reiterates that incarceration is an
inherently governmental function and, accordingly, private companies that engage in
the business will be held to the same standards. And much like the litigation
concerning the conditions in ADX, the constitutional challenges to conditions inside
for-profit immigration prisons would impose some transparency and, ultimately,
accountability on the officials who work inside and the companies who manage and
oversee the project. Each of these aims is crucial to ensuring prisoners across the
United States—no matter the agency that incarcerates them nor the entity that
operates the prison in which they are confined—are afforded equal access to the
Constitution and the federal courts.
CONCLUSION
Justice Stevens predicted dire circumstances for federal prisoners in private
prisons when he dissented from the majority’s opinion in Malesko: “Indeed, a tragic
consequence of today’s decision is the clear incentive it gives to corporate managers
of privately operated custodial institutions to adopt cost-saving policies that
jeopardize the constitutional rights of the tens of thousands of inmates in their
custody.”228 The Court’s decisions in Malesko and Minneci disallowing prisoners a
constitutional tort remedy against private prisons and their employees have created
a differentiated system of constitutional accountability among America’s prisons.
Prisoners in government-run prisons may bring tort claims against the prison officials
who violate their constitutional rights; prisoners in for-profit federal prisons may not
bring the same claims against the prison officials who violate those same rights.
Indeed, the consequences of these decisions are “incongruous and confusing,” as
Justice Stevens predicted.229
No group of prisoners feels this on a larger scale than those people confined in
for-profit immigration prisons. The daily population of people in immigration
confinement is growing each year, and a large majority of those people will at one
time during their confinement be in a private prison. Should their constitutional rights
be violated in those spaces—as they were for Roberto, who pleaded for more than a
year for medical treatment for the painful symptoms of his gunshot injuries—they
will have no remedy to hold the responsible people accountable. Indeed, the spaces
are constitutionally unaccountable.
The punitive nature of modern immigration confinement—premised on the civil
detention fallacy—renders this incongruence among people in federal for-profit
immigration prisons and those in government-run prisons unjustifiable. The inability
of people in for-profit immigration confinement to hold their jailers constitutionally
accountable undermines the constitutional value of dignity, permits the abdication of
the constitutional function of incarceration, and impedes the constitutional goals of
transparency and accountability. In future work, I will show how for-profit
immigration prisons should be “constitutionalized” through a reframing of the
current debate regarding immigration confinement and the for-profit prison industry
to achieve incremental doctrinal shifts geared toward dismantling the public-private

228. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 81 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 82.
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prison divide. The Constitution, and its promise of dignity for all, demands nothing
less.

